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Abstract
The Gambling Task is a complex neuropsychological test (in the form of a card game) that
examines the ability of individuals to assess potential immediate gains over long-term losses.
Gambling Task performance has been examined in previous studies with individuals who are
dependent on alcohol, cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine. These studies have shown that those
who are dependent on the aforementioned substances perform more poorly on the Gambling
Task than controls. Specifically, in relation to controls, drug/alcohol dependent individuals show
impairment by tending to pick more cards that have large immediate gains and very large
delayed punishers. The delayed punisher is larger than the immediate gain, so there is a net loss
in play money. Individuals who are not dependent on substances tend to choose cards that yield
small immediate gains and very small delayed punishers. The delayed punisher is smaller than
the immediate gain, so there is a net increase in play money. In order to test the hypothesis that
heavy smokers display the same pattern of decision-making, the Gambling Task was
administered to a sample of 40 participants (23 heavy smokers and 17 never-smokers). Results
indicated that heavy smokers performed more poorly on the Gambling Task than non-smoking
controls. Specifically, heavy smokers chose more cards from the decks with large delayed
punishers than did the control group.
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Introduction
Researchers have speculated that addictive behaviors, including substance dependence
and gambling, share a common etiology (Wilcox & Erickson, 2000). Wilcox and Erickson
suggested that addictions are a result of changes in brain chemistry and learning. They theorized
that two factors must be present in order for an addiction to develop. First, after a drug is
ingested, the medial forebrain bundle region of the brain must be activated. Second, after
ingesting a drug, it must affect neural conduction quickly, and neural activity must drop below
normal levels before returning to baseline. This drop in neural activity has been termed the
“rebound effect” and is thought to be a major cause of withdrawal. Other researchers argue that
addictions are more complex than the theory proposed by Wilcox and Erickson. For example,
Koob, Sanna, and Bloom (1998) argued that other brain regions are active in the development of
addictions. Specifically, they hypothesized that the extended amygdala is pivotal to the
development of addictions.
Structural and Functional Brain Abnormalities in Substance Abusers
Jentsch and Taylor (1999) suggested that drug seeking behavior can be explained, in part,
by impaired inhibitory control of behavior. They theorized that this impairment stems from
dysfunction in the frontal cortical area. Jentsch and Taylor hypothesized that drug seeking
behavior may be the result of two distinct phenomena acting synergistically. First, long-term
exposure to a substance may increase the salience of the substance by activating prefrontal
cortical dopamine release. This idea has been supported by research that suggests that repeated
use of drugs decreases dopamine stores in the prefrontal cortex (Jentsch, Verrico, Le, & Roth,
1998; Sorg, Davidson, Kalivas, & Prasad, 1997). Animal research has shown that drug
administration will lead to an immediate increase of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex
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(Moghaddam & Bunney, 1989; Nisell, Nomikos, Hertel, Panagis, & Svensson, 1996). Secondly,
the individual may be less able to inhibit their behavior because of damage to the prefrontal
cortex. If repeated use of drugs of abuse affect the frontal cortex in such a way to diminish the
ability for individuals to inhibit responses, and the drug of abuse becomes a dominant reinforcer,
then these “reward related stimuli could virtually dominate responding” (Jentsch and Taylor,
1999). Their model purports that drug consumption is a direct consequence of deficits in
inhibitory control and enhancements in stimulus-reward learning.
Several studies have detected structural abnormalities in the brains of those who abuse
substances. Liu, Matochik, Cadet, and London (1998) found that the prefrontal cortex of the
polysubstance abuser is comparatively smaller than that of non-drug abusing controls. Harper
and Kril (1990) found that alcoholics have a smaller volume of gray matter in their frontal lobes
than non-alcoholics. Although the origin of these structural abnormalities is not completely clear,
some possible explanations have been suggested. There is substantial empirical evidence that
supports the idea that children of alcoholics may inherit a vulnerability to develop the disorder
themselves (Bohman, Cloninger, Sigvardsson, & von-Knorring, 1987). Wiers, Sergeant, and
Gunning (1994) suggested that this vulnerability may be related to congenital brain defects in the
prefrontal cortex. Alternatively, neuropathological studies have suggested that repeated exposure
to drugs of abuse may result in atrophy of neurons in the prefrontal cortex (Harper & Kril, 1990).
Collectively, these studies suggest that a combination of congenital defects and atrophy of
neurons in the prefrontal cortex may be related to the structural brain abnormalities found in
substance abusers.
A number of studies that have examined Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and
Single-Photon Computed Tomography (SPECT) scans of the brains of cocaine abusers have
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shown marked decreases in the amount of cerebral blood flow in the prefrontal cortex (Tumeh,
Nagel, English, Moore, & Holman, 1990; Volkow, Mullani, Gould, Adler, & Krajewski, 1988;
Weber et al., 1993). Individuals who abuse cocaine have been shown to exhibit differences in
metabolic activity in their orbitofrontal cortex when compared with matched controls (Volkow et
al., 1991). Hommer et al. (1997) detected similar abnormalities in alcohol abusers. Volkow et al.
(1992) found reduced cerebral blood flow in the frontal cortices of cocaine abusers up to 4
months after cocaine use terminated. Volkow et al. (1992) also found that this reduction in
cerebral blood flow was positively correlated with the dose and number of years of cocaine use.
These findings consistently suggest that repeated use of addictive substances is associated with
changes in the way the brain functions, especially the prefrontal cortex.
Dysfunction of the frontostriatal systems is thought to be related to the planning deficits
seen in other psychological disorders (Frith, 1987). It appears that this area of the brain is very
important in the inhibition of impulses. Damasio (1996) suggested that damage to the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex leads to deficits in planning. Damage to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex has also been shown to lead to impairment in the extinction of an operant
response in monkeys (Rosenkilde, 1979). These findings, along with the brain abnormalities
already mentioned, suggest that there may be a relationship between drug abusers’ impaired
decision making and impairments in their ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Substance abusers may
impulsively use their drug of choice, even after they have received repeated negative
consequences, partially because of damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bartzokis et
al., 2000; Bechara et al., 2001; Grant, Contoreggi, & London, 2000; Petry, Bickel, & Arnett,
1998). This damage may impair a person’s ability to learn to inhibit previously reinforcing
behaviors or to recognize future consequences.
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Performance on the Delayed Discounting Task
Individuals vary greatly in their preferences for immediate versus delayed rewards. Those
who prefer immediate rewards may be more likely to develop addictions (Bickel & Marsch,
2001; Vuchinich & Tucker, 1988). Discounting of delayed rewards has been suggested as a way
to measure impulsivity in substance abusers. Delay discounting refers to the phenomenon where
a delayed reinforcer has subjectively less value than an immediate reinforcer. By using a
measure of discounting of delayed rewards, Petry (2001a) found that heavy drinkers seem to be
more impulsive than light drinkers and abstainers. Heavy drinkers were more likely to choose
smaller, short-term rewards instead of larger, delayed rewards. For example, heavy drinkers were
more likely than light drinkers to prefer a smaller amount of money awarded immediately, rather
than a larger sum of money given at some point in the future.
Mitchell (1999) showed that smokers were more impulsive on a delayed discounting task
than subjects who had never smoked. Smokers were also more likely to score higher on the
Eysenck Impulsivity Questionnaire (Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1968) than non-smokers. In addition,
smokers scored higher than non-smokers on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, &
Barratt, 1995) – a three subscale test that assesses “non-planning”, “cognitive complexity”, and
“motor impulsiveness.” The results of this study support the idea that smokers, like other drug
abusers, are more impulsive than non-drug users.
Bickel, Odum, and Madden (1999) suggested that smokers display the same
impulsiveness that other drug users do. The authors tested their hypothesis by examining whether
current smokers discounted the value of delayed money more than a comparison group of
nonsmokers. They found that the subjective value of delayed reinforcement is quickly
diminished in smokers, as it is in individuals who are dependent on other drugs. The authors also

4

found that never and ex-smokers did not differ in their discounting rates. Two possible reasons
for this finding were suggested. First, the level of delayed discounting that occurs in smokers
may be malleable. After the individual remains abstinent for some period of time, their level of
delayed discounting may return to pre-smoking levels. The alternate explanation for this finding
is that there may have been a selection bias in the ex-smoker group. The ex-smoker group may
have been made up of people who were less likely to discount delayed rewards, even before they
quit smoking, which theoretically, would have made it easier for this group to quit smoking in
the first place.
Many substance abusers are eventually able to stop abusing drugs. It has long been
known that with abstinence, physical health improves. More recently, there has been consistent
scientific evidence that discounting of delayed rewards may also decrease when the substance
abuser stops smoking cigarettes, using intravenous drugs, or drinking alcohol (Bickel et al.,
1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Petry, 2001b). The reasons for this decrease in delay discounting,
and possibly impulsivity, are not entirely understood.
Bickel and Marsch (2001) conducted a review of the literature that examined the role of
delayed discounting on impulsivity and loss of control in drug users. They suggested that
delayed discounting in substance abusers may account for both their tendency to respond
impulsively and their apparent loss of control. The authors suggested that drug abusers are
impulsive in that a smaller, immediate reinforcer (i.e., drugs) becomes more important than
larger, delayed reinforcers (e.g., better grades, better relationship with family). The authors also
stated that drug abusers display a loss of control concerning whether or not they will use drugs.
Bickel and Marsch defined this loss of control as a reversal of preference from a delayed, larger
reward (e.g., abstinence, better health) to a smaller, more immediate reward (e.g., high from
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drugs). For example, when a drug abuser attempts to quit or decrease his level of drug
consumption, he chooses a delayed, larger reward over a smaller, more immediate reward. When
the drug abuser relapses or uses more than he intends to use, he has reverted back to choosing
smaller, more immediate rewards over the larger, delayed rewards.
Heyman (1996) suggested that delay discounting may help explain the phenomenon of
preference reversals (i.e., initially deciding to choose a long-term reward over a smaller shortterm reward but later, when the immediate reward is available, electing to accept the smaller
reward). The nicotine-addicted individual may decide to decrease the number of cigarettes he/she
smokes each day because being healthier is very important to him/her. Later, he may decide that
smoking will not hurt his health very much in the short run and he may return to smoking at his
normal level.
Immediate gratification can be obtained in a number of ways, including drug use,
gambling, or other addictive behaviors. Petry (2001b) found that pathological gamblers were
more likely to discount delayed rewards than non-gamblers. Also, gamblers who had comorbid
substance abuse problems were more likely to discount delayed rewards than gamblers without
substance abuse problems. These results support the idea that the discounting of delayed rewards
is related to impulse control in dependence to substances as well as other addictive behaviors.
The common co-occurrence of pathological gambling and substance abuse has led to the
hypothesis that a common etiological process may occur within these populations. Evidence
suggests (McCormick, 1993; Petry & Casarella, 1999) that the etiological process involves
impairment of impulse control. Petry (2001b) suggested that individuals who have moderate
levels of impulsivity may develop only one behavior that appears impulsive (e.g., drugs or
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gambling), but with more severe impulsivity, individuals may engage in multiple impulsive
behaviors.
Impairment on the Gambling Task
Substance abusers have shown impairments on a number of tests that measure brain
functioning. Beatty, Katzung, Moreland, and Nixon (1995) found that individuals who have
abused cocaine or alcohol have significant impairments on neuropsychological tests that measure
learning and memory, problem solving and abstraction, and perceptual motor speed. The authors
found that these neuropsychological deficits remain for at least three to five weeks after drug or
alcohol use has stopped. Some research, however, suggests that these changes in brain
functioning can be reversed. A study conducted by Azrin, Millsaps, Burton, and Mittenberg
(1992) found that some recovery of function may occur after cocaine abusers abstain from drug
use.
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) developed a gambling task that is
sensitive to damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The authors showed that subjects who
had lesions on their ventromedial prefrontal cortex were more likely than controls without such
lesions, to select cards that yielded large, immediate rewards and very large delayed punishers,
thus incurring a net loss in play money. The authors hypothesized that lesions in this area may
result in a lack of concern for future consequences.
There is evidence that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is activated in decision making.
Elliott, Frith, and Dolan (1997) showed that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is activated in
planning and guessing tasks. PET scans of individuals who were not impaired on the Gambling
Task have demonstrated that there is increased activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
when completing the Gambling Task (Grant, Bonson, Contoreggi, & London, 1999). Bechara,
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Tranel, and Damasio (2000) found that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is active when
performing the Gambling Task.
Bechara et al. (2000) conducted an experiment to determine if individuals with lesions on
their ventromedial prefrontal cortex were impaired on the Gambling Task due to a lack of
concern for the future consequences of their behavior. Three possible causes of this decisionmaking impairment were examined: 1) the individual is oversensitive to rewards, 2) the
individual is insensitive to punishment, or 3) the individual is insensitive to the future
consequences of his behavior, positive and negative. Results suggested that individuals with
lesions on their ventromedial prefrontal cortex tended to be focused on immediate rewards and
largely oblivious to future positive and negative consequences.
Bechara et al. (2000) distinguished between two types of impulsivity: motor impulsivity
and cognitive impulsivity. Motor impulsivity is defined as responding before all necessary
information is obtained, or quickly responding without thinking. Cognitive impulsivity refers to
“a failure to delay gratification and evaluate the outcome of a planned action” (Bechara et al.,
2000). The authors suggested that the behavior of individuals with ventromedial prefrontal
cortex lesions was primarily consistent with the latter definition of impulsivity.
It has been suggested that individuals abuse drugs because the positive consequences of
drug use are immediate and the negative consequences are more protracted. To test this
hypothesis, Petry et al. (1998) administered the Stanford Time Perception Inventory (STPI;
Zimbardo, 1992), the Future Time Perspective task (FTP; Wallace, 1956), and the Gambling
Task (Bechara et al., 1994) to a group of individuals who were dependent on heroin. Results
showed that individuals dependent on heroin were less likely to think about their future and more
likely to focus on short-term rewards than non-drug users. Furthermore, heroin dependent
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individuals were worse at predicting future events that may occur in their lives, less able to
foresee protracted futures for others, and less able to sequentially order the future on the Future
Time Perspective task. These findings suggest that drug users may continue to use despite
serious consequences because their ability to predict delayed events is impaired (Petry et al.,
1998).
Petry et al. (1998) also found that heroin-dependent individuals, who were in treatment
for an average of 3.7 months, were more likely than non-drug users to choose cards that resulted
in large immediate positive consequences, even when the positive rewards were outweighed by
delayed negative consequences. Heroin-dependent subjects were also less likely to pick cards
from the decks that yielded small, immediate, positive rewards and smaller negative
consequences, even though picking from those decks resulted in net gains. The authors
concluded by stating that their findings suggest that drug abusers select short-term rewards (e.g.,
euphoria, relief from depression) over long-term rewards (e.g., successful career, healthy life)
because preference for delayed rewards may require an elaborate time perspective, which
substance abusers may lack. Furthermore, drug abusers may discount delayed negative
consequences (e.g., being arrested, health problems) because they are delayed in time.
Bechara et al. (2001) compared the performance of three different groups of subjects on
the Gambling Task. The first group was made up of subjects who had lesions on their
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the second group was made up of individuals that were
dependent on alcohol, cocaine or amphetamine, and the third group of participants was made up
of non-substance dependent controls. Results showed that the substance abusers performed as
poorly as the lesioned group on the Gambling Task. The control group performed significantly
better than both of the other groups. The authors noted that substance abusers often exhibit

9

behaviors similar to that of individuals with lesions on their ventromedial prefrontal cortex. For
example, these individuals often engage in behaviors that lead to immediate gratification and
ignore the long-term, adverse consequences of their behavior. The authors suggested that the
substance abuser group and the ventromedial lesion group may have performed similarly because
of a shared defect in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
One of the goals of Bechara et al. (2001) was to determine if neuropsychological tests of
cognitive ability, other than the Gambling Task, could account for the decision impairments seen
in individuals who are dependent on cocaine, amphetamine, or alcohol. To that end, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, the Tower of Hanoi, and the Stroop test were administered along
with a test of intelligence. Other factors such as demographics, comorbid depression, anxiety,
and psychopathy were also examined as possible causes of impaired performance on the
Gambling Task. Results revealed that none of the demographic variables or neuropsychological
tests accounted for the impaired performance of the substance abuse group and brain lesioned
group on the Gambling Task. Thereby, adding evidence that the Gambling Task is sensitive to a
specific type of impairment that the other measures do not detect.
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Anderson (1998) successfully demonstrated that lesions
centered on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, but not lesions on the dorsolateral area of the
prefrontal cortex, were significantly related to impairment on the Gambling Task. Grant et al.
(2000) followed up the previous study by comparing individuals with a history of opioid or
stimulant abuse with controls that had no history of substance abuse. The authors’ goal was to
determine if substance abusers had deficits in a specific portion of the prefrontal cortex rather
than a general impairment extending throughout the prefrontal cortex. For this purpose, the
Gambling Task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task were administered to the subjects. The
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Gambling Task, as previously mentioned, has been shown to be sensitive to damage localized on
the ventromedial portion of the prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al., 1994), while the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task has been shown to be sensitive to damage in the dorsolateral portion of the
prefrontal cortex (Milner, 1963; Robinson, Heaton, Lehman, & Stilson, 1980). They found that
substance abusers scored significantly worse on the Gambling Task than individuals with no
history of substance abuse. However, there was no difference in the scores of substance abusers
and non-substance abusers on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. These findings suggest that
substance abusers do not have generalized impairment across the entirety of their prefrontal
cortex, rather their impairment seems to be localized to the ventromedial area of the prefrontal
cortex.
Bartzokis et al. (2000) found that a sample of recently abstinent cocaine-dependent men
(RA) preformed better on the Gambling Task than cocaine-dependent men who were not
abstinent (NA). The authors administered a number of neuropsychological tests (including the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, the California Verbal Learning Test, and the Gambling Task) to
determine which part(s) of the brain would be affected by recent abstinence from cocaine. The
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task measures set shifting and concept formation, and has been shown
to be effective in the identification of individuals with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex damage. The
California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) assesses verbal learning and short-term memory related
to functions of the left temporal lobe and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Crosson, Sartor,
Jenny, Nabors, & Moberg, 1993; Hildebrandt, Brand, & Sachsenheimer, 1998; Johnson, Saykin,
Flashman, McAllister, & Sparling, 2001). Finally, the Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994) is
used in the detection of high-risk choices and is sensitive to damage in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. The authors found that the NA group was impaired on the Gambling Task
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only, while the RA group was not impaired on any of the tasks. Therefore, the NA group showed
impairment that was consistent with damage localized to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. One
interpretation of these findings is that the decision-making impairments related to cocaine
dependence, may be reversible once the individual becomes abstinent (Bartzokis et al., 2000).
Monterosso, Ehrman, Napier, O’Brien, and Childress (2001) administered three
neuropsychological tests (i.e., the Delay Discounting Test, the Gambling Task, and the Rogers
Decision Making Task) to cocaine dependent individuals to determine if the tests measure the
same construct. The Delay Discounting Procedure (Ainslie & Haendel, 1983; Mazur, 1987) has
been used as a behavioral test of impulsivity. In this task the subject chooses between smaller,
immediate rewards or larger, delayed rewards. The second task the authors administered was the
Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994). The third task, the Rogers Decision Making Task (Rogers
et al., 1999), was designed, as was the Gambling Task, to measure dysfunction in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In this task, a subject is presented with a row of 10 boxes and
must decide which color box has a token under it. For some trials, there is an obvious advantage
for one color over the other because the number of boxes of each color is not equal. Winning on
this task requires sticking to a favorite color (when the number of boxes of each color is equal)
and wagering more points on less risky trials.
Monterosso et al. (2001) pointed out that numerous studies have demonstrated that
substance abusers show deficits on all three tasks. They stated that if it were determined that
these tasks are measuring the same construct, then a clearer understanding of the construct could
be gained and a more valid measure could be developed. The relationship between each
decision-making task and the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale of the Zuckerman-Kuhlman
Personality Questionnaire (Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993) was also
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assessed. The authors found that there was no significant relationship between impulsive
sensation seeking and the Gambling Task or the Rogers Decision Making Task. However, the
authors did find a significant relationship between the Delay Discounting Procedure and the
Gambling Task. This finding suggests that those who discount future rewards more rapidly on
the Delay Discounting Procedure chose fewer cards from the decks that lead to a net gain on the
Gambling Task. The Rogers Decision Making Task was marginally related to the Delay
Discounting Procedure and the Gambling Task. The authors concluded by stating that there is
support that all three tasks are measuring the same, or similar, decision making deficit.
Variables Influencing the Decision to Smoke or Abstain
Eiser (1983) attempted to show that smokers smoke tobacco because of short-term
reinforcement contingencies. Eiser suggested that a person’s Subjective Expected Utility
(Edwards, 1954), the individual’s assessment of the positive or negative outcome of a behavior,
will determine if he will smoke or not. Before an individual begins smoking, he must weigh
short-term reinforcement and long-term negative consequences. However, this decisional
balancing is not always a concerted effort. Eiser stated that at some point, a smoker may choose
to focus on short-term reinforcing effects of smoking, and dismiss the possible long-term
negative consequences.
Sutton, Marsh, and Matheson’s (1987) expectancy-value model suggests that a smoker’s
decision to abstain from smoking is related to his confidence or self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977)
that he would be successful. Therefore, the weighing of positive and negative consequences of
ceasing to smoke would theoretically play an important role in his decision-making process.
Impairments may occur in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, where it is theorized that the
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relative weights are applied to short-term rewards and long-term negative consequences
(O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Rolls, 2000).
In summary, there is empirical evidence that suggests that individuals who abuse
substances are more impulsive than individuals who do not abuse drugs. Past studies have found
that those who abuse cocaine, alcohol, amphetamine, and heroin have structural and/or
functional impairments in a region of the brain known as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
There is a growing consensus that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is involved in applying
relative weights to short-term and long-term consequences. Furthermore, it has been shown that
this area of the brain is active when performing the Gambling Task.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether heavy smokers are impaired on the
Gambling task (Bechara et al., 2000), which has been correlated with dysfunction in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. It was hypothesized that heavy smokers would exhibit impaired
decision-making that is similar to the impairment that has been found in individuals who abuse
alcohol, cocaine, opiates, and amphetamine. Specifically, it was expected that heavy smokers
would choose more cards from the decks that lead to a net loss (decks A’ and B’) and fewer
cards from the decks that result in a net gain (decks C’ and D’) than a group of controls that have
never smoked.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited by placing an advertisement in a local newspaper in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. The advertisement read “Smokers and nonsmokers needed for paid nonmedical research.” A total of 40 individuals participated in this study (23 heavy smokers and 17
nonsmokers). Participants were paid $10.00 for their participation. All participants signed an
informed consent form approved by the Institutional Review Board at Louisiana State University
(LSU).
Instruments
Smoking Status Questionnaire. This form was used to assess demographic characteristics
of the sample, including age, sex, and ethnicity, in addition to assessing present and past
smoking patterns, such as number of prior quit attempts. It includes the Fagerström Test for
Nicotine Dependence to determine level of nicotine dependence (FTND; Heatherton, Kozlowski,
Frecker, and Fagerström, 1991).
Carbon Monoxide (CO) analysis. Breath samples were taken with a Vitalograph Breath
CO portable CO monitor to verify smoking status. Smokers were identified as having a CO
reading of at least 10 parts per million (ppm).
Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST). The MAST (Selzer, 1971) is a 25-item
questionnaire designed to measure a history of problematic alcohol use. The MAST has a testretest reliability of .84 and an internal consistency of .85 (Skinner & Sheu, 1982).
Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST). The DAST (Skinner, 1982) is a 28-item
questionnaire designed to measure substance abuse history. The DAST has an internal
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consistency reliability of .92 and significantly discriminates substance abusers from non-abusers
(Skinner, 1982).
Drug History. Participants were asked to disclose if they have ever been dependent on or
abused any drug. Participants were also asked to list the type, frequency, and age at first and last
use for all drugs they have used in the past (see Appendix A).
Gambling Task. The computerized version of the Gambling Task was used in this
experiment (Bechara et al., 2000). In this task the participant is seated in front of a computer
screen on which there are four decks of cards. The decks are labeled A’, B’, C’, and D’. The
participant is prompted to pick a card from one of the decks. The participant uses the mouse to
pick a card and he/she is informed of the consequences. Each deck consists of 30 black cards and
30 red cards. The color of the cards is not related to whether a participant will gain or lose money
for this task. Also, a distinct sound is made by the computer when the participants win and lose
money. The computer keeps track of the cards the participant chooses.
Decks A’ and B’ pay $100 on average, while decks C’ and D’ pay $50 on average.
However, decks A’ and B’ yield greater penalties than decks C’ and D’. Taking into account
rewards and penalties, picking from decks A’ or B’ yield a net loss of $250 for the first 10-card
block. The net loss for picking cards from decks A’ or B’ increases by $150 for every 10-card
block until block six where the net loss is $1,000. The only difference between decks A’ and B’
is that in deck A’ the frequency of punishment increases but the average magnitude of
punishment remains constant. In deck B’ the magnitude of punishment increases, but the
frequency of punishment remains constant. For the purposes of this study, decks A’ and B’ will
be termed “bad decks” and cards from these decks will be termed “bad cards,” as choosing cards
from these decks result in net losses.
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Picking from decks C’ or D’ yields a net gain of $250 for the first 10-card block. This net
gain increases by $50 for each 10-card block until block six when the net gain is $375. In deck
C’ the frequency of punishment increases, but the average magnitude of punishment remains
constant. In deck D’, the magnitude of punishment increases but the frequency of punishment
remains constant. For the purposes of this study, decks C’ and D’ will be termed “good decks”
and cards from these decks will be termed “good cards,” as choosing cards from these decks
result in net gains.
Following Bechara et al. (2001), the participants picked a total of 100 cards and the intertrial interval between card picks was set at 6s. Each participant’s score was tallied by summing
the number of cards picked from decks A’ and B’ for each 20 card block. The number of cards
picked from decks C’ and D’ were tallied in the same manner.
Procedure
Individuals who called the Smoking Laboratory at LSU in response to the advertisement
underwent a telephone screening. Individuals who were 25 years of age or older were included if
they currently smoked at least 20 cigarettes per day (i.e., heavy smokers), and had been smoking
for at least 10 years, or if they had never smoked.
Those who met criteria were given a brief description of the study and scheduled for an
experimental session on the LSU campus. Participants were given directions to the Psychological
Services Center (PSC) in the basement of Johnston Hall. Upon arrival to the PSC, participants
were greeted by a research assistant who described the study procedure, answered any questions,
and obtained informed consent. Participants were then asked to provide a breath sample for CO
analysis to verify self-reported smoking status. The following instruments were then
administered: the Smoking Status Questionnaire, MAST, DAST, and Drug History. The
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participants were instructed (A. Bechara, personal communication, May 18, 2002) on how to
complete the computerized Gambling Task (see Appendix B), and the task was administered.
Once he/she completed the measures and task, the participant was debriefed, thanked for their
participation, and paid $10.
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Results
Participant Characteristics
A total of 527 individuals phoned the Smoking Research Laboratory at LSU and left their
contact information. Of the two hundred fifty-six individuals that were successfully contacted
and assessed over the phone, 159 met criteria for participation in this study. Those that were
excluded did not meet age, smoking rate, and years smoking criteria. Fifty-one of the individuals
that met criteria declined to participate after the study was explained to them. A testing session
was scheduled for the remaining 108 individuals who met inclusion criteria. Sixty-eight
individuals no-showed and 40 participants (23 heavy smokers and 17 never-smokers) attended
their session and completed the testing measures.
The following two analyses were conducted in order to determine whether the smokers
who attended their testing session differed from those that did not attend their testing session in
daily smoking rate or number of years smoked. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted with status (show vs. no show) as the independent variable and number of cigarettes
smoked per day as the dependent variable. Results showed that those who attended their testing
session were not significantly different from those who did not attend their testing session in the
number of cigarettes they smoked per day (25.35 vs. 27.13), F(1,69) = .58, ns. A one-way
ANOVA was conducted with status (show vs. no show) as the independent variable and number
of years smoked as the dependent variable. Results showed that the individuals who attended
their testing session did not differ in the number of years smoked from those who did not attend
(25.48 vs. 21.02), F(1,69) = 3.21, ns.
A total of 40 participants took part in this experiment (23 heavy smokers and 17 neversmokers). Participants were considered smokers if their CO level was 10 ppm or above. There
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were no discrepancies between self-reported smoking status and the breath CO analysis
conducted on each participant. The characteristics of the smokers and never-smokers are listed in
Table 1.
Table 1. Participant Characteristics
Overall
N = 40
Age (SD)
43.83 (12.10)
Sex
Male
Female
Ethnicity
Caucasian
African-American
Other
MAST (SD)
DAST (SD)
CO

Smokers
n = 23
41.65 (8.57)

Never-Smokers
n = 17
46.76 (15.49)

p
ns

42.5%
57.5%

60.9%
39.1%

17.6%
82.4%

p < .01
p < .01

72.5%
25.0%
2.5%
11.63 (15.64)
4.83 (6.38)
19.9 ppm

69.6%
26.1%
4.3%
16.96 (18.02)
7.26 (7.46)
33.3 ppm

76.5%
23.5%

ns
ns

3.47 (4.21)
1.53 (1.66)
1.8 ppm

p < .01
p < .01
p < .001

A Chi-square with ethnicity (Caucasian vs. Non-Caucasian) and group (heavy smokers
vs. never-smokers) as the factors, revealed that the groups did not differ in ethnicity, X²(1, N =
40) = .23, ns. A second Chi-square with sex (male vs. female) and group (heavy smokers vs.
never-smokers) as the factors, revealed that the groups significantly differed in sex, X²(1, N = 40)
= 7.47, p < .01. There were more males in the heavy smoker group and more females in the
never-smoker group.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted with group (heavy smokers vs. never-smokers) as
the independent variable and the continuous variables (age, MAST scores, and DAST scores) as
the dependent variables. Groups did not differ in age, F(1, 38) = 1.78, ns. However, the groups
did differ significantly in MAST scores, F(1,36) = 8.05, p < .01 and DAST scores, F(1,38) =
9.62, p < .01, with heavy smokers having higher scores on both measures. See Table 1 for
MAST and DAST means and standard deviations. The heavy smokers smoked a mean of 27.52
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(SD = 6.35) cigarettes per day, and had been smoking for a mean of 25.74 (SD = 9.42) years. The
mean score on the FTND was 6.39 (SD = 1.83), indicating the smoking participants were
nicotine dependent.
Performance on the Gambling Task
Each participant chose 100 cards. Following the procedures of Bechara et al. (2001), the
cards were broken up into 5 20-card blocks, which were scored separately. That is, each
participant received a score for the number of “good cards” that he/she chose in block 1 (cards 1
through 20), block 2 (cards 21 through 40), block 3 (cards 41 through 60), block 4 (cards 61
through 80), and block 5 (cards 81 through 100). The same procedure was followed for the cards
chosen from the “bad decks.”
A two-way ANOVA was conducted with group (heavy smokers vs. never-smokers) as
the between subjects factor, block (5 levels) as the within subjects factor, and number of cards
chosen from the “good decks” as the dependent variable. Although the groups differed on MAST
scores, DAST scores, and sex at baseline, these variables were not entered as covariates, because
they were not significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Results showed that there was
a main effect for block, F(4,152) = 3.13, p < .05. See Table 2 for block means. There was also a
significant block by group interaction, in which the never-smokers improved in the number of
“good cards” they chose as the task progressed, and the smokers did not, F(4,152) = 5.68, p <
.001 (see Figure 1). See Table 3 for cell means.
Table 2. Block Means for the Number of “Good Cards” Picked
M
Block 1
9.30
Block 2
9.08abc
Block 3
10.50a
Block 4
10.73b
Block 5
10.93c
Note. Values that share the same subscript differ significantly at p < .05.
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13

Good Cards Picked

12
11
10
9
Smokers
Never Smokers

8
7
6
1

2

3

4

5

Block
Figure 1. Smokers and never-smokers performance on the Gambling Task.
Monterosso et al. (2001) showed that using only the last 50 trials on the Gambling Task
is a more reliable measure of performance, than using all 100 trials. They reasoned that, during
the first 50 trials, the participants are learning the reward and punishment schedules. Therefore,
if all 100 trials were to be counted, participants’ scores could be inflated or deflated, depending
on the strategy the participant took in learning the task. Following the suggestion of Monterosso
et al., only the last 50 trials of the Gambling Task were used to determine whether the heavy
smokers’ performance differed from the never-smokers’ performance. A one-way ANOVA was
conducted with group (heavy smokers vs. never-smokers) as the independent variable and the
number of “bad cards” chosen in the last 50 trials as the dependent variable. This analysis
revealed that heavy smokers chose significantly more “bad cards” than never-smokers on the last
50 trials (25.70 vs. 19.71), F(1, 38) = 4.16, p < .05.
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Table 3. Cell Means for the Number of “Good Cards” Picked
Smokers
Never-Smokers
n = 23
n = 17
p
Block 1
10.87
7.18
p < .005
Block 2
8.26
10.18
p < .05
Block 3
10.00
11.17
ns
Block 4
9.69
12.12
ns
Block 5
9.73
12.53
p = .07, ns
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Discussion
The goal of this study was to determine if heavy smokers choose more cards that yield a
net loss and less cards that yield a net gain than never-smokers on a neuropsychological task that
tests an individual’s ability to weigh immediate gains over long-term losses (Gambling Task). As
hypothesized, heavy smokers picked a greater number of cards from the decks that yielded a net
loss (decks A’ and B’), and fewer cards from the decks that yielded a net gain (decks C’ and D’),
than did the never-smokers. This pattern of responding has been found in previous research that
has used heroin, amphetamine, cocaine, and alcohol dependents as participants (Bartzokis et al.,
2000; Bechara et al., 2001; Grant et al., 2000; Monterosso et al., 2001; Petry et al., 1998). The
authors of the aforementioned studies suggested that poor performance on the Gambling Task
may be due to impairment in decision-making. The cause of this decision-making impairment is
not completely clear, however, poor performance on this task has been correlated with damage or
dysfunction in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 2000;
Bechara et al., 2001; Grant et al., 1999).
As expected, there was a block main effect. This effect was consistent with the prediction
that participants would learn the contingencies of the task as the trials progressed. A significant
interaction between block and group was also found. In the first 20-card block, heavy smokers
chose more cards from the “good decks” than did never-smokers; however, never-smokers
choose more cards from the “good decks” in each of the four remaining blocks (see Figure 1).
The results of this study are consistent with the findings of previous research that has
shown that those dependent on alcohol (Smart, 1968) and heroin (Petry et al., 1998) appear to
have a decreased ability to predict their own future life events and the future life events of others.
It has been speculated that this diminished ability to predict future events may lead to a decrease
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in sensitivity to the delayed consequences of one’s behavior (Petry et al., 1998). By selecting
cards that yielded large rewards and very large delayed punishers rather than cards that yielded
small rewards and very small delayed punishers, it can be said that heavy smokers seemed to be
more concerned about the immediate (rewards) rather than delayed consequences (punishers) of
their behavior. Future research should examine if heavy smokers have a diminished ability to
predict the future consequences of their behavior.
One possible limitation of this study is that results showed that the groups were
significantly different in sex. However, no significant sex effect has been found in prior research
using the Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 2001; Grant et al., 2000; Monterosso et al., 2001; Petry
et al., 1998). Thus, there is no evidence that the observed impaired performance of heavy
smokers is due to sex differences. In this study, sex was not significantly correlated with the
dependent variable. Therefore, consistent with previous findings, sex did not have a significant
effect on Gambling Task performance.
Another possible limitation of this study is that MAST and DAST scores were higher for
heavy smokers than never-smokers. This result was expected because past research has shown
that smokers are more likely than nonsmokers to use drugs and alcohol (Anthony & EcheagarayWagner, 2000; Jackson, Sher, & Wood, 2000; John, Hill, Rumpf, Hapke, & Meyer, 2003).
MAST and DAST scores were not significantly correlated with the dependent variable (i.e.,
number of “bad cards” chosen); therefore, they were not entered as covariates.
In summary, heavy smokers were shown to perform more poorly than never-smokers on
a test of decision-making (i.e., the Gambling Task). Specifically, heavy smokers chose more
cards that yielded large short-term reinforcers and very large punishers (net loss), and fewer
cards that yielded small short-term reinforcers and very small long-term punishers (net gain) than
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did never-smokers. The results of this study are similar to other studies that have examined the
performance of individuals who abuse or are dependent on alcohol, cocaine, amphetamine, and
heroin.
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Appendix A
Drug History
Have you ever abused any substance (other than nicotine)? YES

NO

(Circle one)

What substance? ________________
Have you ever been dependent on a substance (other than nicotine)? YES

NO

(Circle one)

What substance? ________________
Please list the type, age at first use, dose used, frequency of use, and the date of last use for all of
the drugs (including alcohol) that you have experimented with in your lifetime.

Drug Type

Age of
First Use

Dose Normally
Used
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Frequency
of Use

# of Years
You Used
This Drug

Date of
Last Use

Appendix B
Instructions for the Computer Gambling Task
1- In front of you on the screen, there are 4 decks of cards A’, B’ C’ and D’.
2- I want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you choose.
3- Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I don’t
know how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every time you win,
the green bar gets bigger.
4- Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you won some
money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I don’t know when you will lose, or how
much you will lose. You will find out as we go along. Every time you lose, the green bar gets
smaller.
5- You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to another at any time, and as often as you
wish.
6- The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible and if you can’t win, avoid losing
money as much as possible.
7- You won’t know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the computer
stops.
8- I am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar here is a
reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and how much money you have
to pay back before we see how much you won or lost.
9- It is important to know that just like in a real card game; the computer does not change the
order of the cards after the game starts. You may not be able to figure out exactly when you will
lose money, but the game is fair. The computer does not make you lose at random, or make you
lose money based on the last card you picked. Also, each deck contains an equal number of
cards of each color, so the color of the cards does not tell you which decks are better in this
game. So you must not try to figure out what the computer is doing. All I can say is that some
decks are worse than the others. You may find all of them bad, but some are worse than others.
No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if you stay away from the worst
decks. Please treat the play money in this game as real money, and any decision on what to do
with it should be made as if you were using your own money.
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